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#2A-8/l8/87 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WAPPINGERS CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Employer/Petitioner. 
-and- CASE NO. C-3194 
WAPPINGERS FEDERATION OF TRANSIT. 
CUSTODIAL AND MAINTENANCE WORKERS. 
Intervenor. 
KRUSE & McNAMARA, ESQS.. for Employer/Petitioner 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Wappingers Central School District (District) from a decision 
of the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director), which dismissed as untimely its 
petition seeking to remove certain positions from a unit 
represented by the Wappingers Federation of Transit. 
Custodial and Maintenance Workers (Federation). 
The District argues that, in the absence of any 
objection by the employee organization representing the 
at-issue bargaining unit, PERB should accept jurisdiction and 
process the petition on its merits, regardless of whether the 
timeliness requirements for filing, contained in its Rules of 
Procedure (Rules), have been met. 
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It is uncontroverted that the appropriate period for 
filing the District's decertification petition occurred in 
November 1985, pursuant to PERB's Rules, §201.3(d), and that 
a new period for filing will occur in November 1987. In view 
of the fact that the petition was filed on January 29. 1987, 
it was filed, according to PERB's Rules, either approximately 
14 months late or 10 months early. Since, at the time of 
filing of this petition, no provision existed for the 
acceptance of untimely filed petitions, the District's 
argument for acceptance of the petition is identical, whether 
it is treated as late or premature,— that is, PERB should 
waive its Rules concerning the timeliness of filing of a 
petition upon the consent of the parties. 
.^/Following the filing of the instant petition, PERB 
amended its Rules, effective May 8, 1987, to provide, at 
Rule 201.2(d), that if a petition is filed prematurely, 
objection to its processing may be made, but that "[s]uch 
objection to the processing of the petition, if not duly 
raised, may be deemed waived." This amendment, however, 
permits the Director to process a premature petition to 
conclusion if its untimeliness is neither discovered by the 
Director nor raised by any party at or prior to the 
commencement of the proceedings. It is not intended to 
compel the Director to accept jurisdiction over untimely 
petitions by reason of the parties' waiver of the 
timeliness rules. This new Rule would, accordingly, have 
no application to the instant case, even if the petition 
had been filed subsequent to its enactment. 
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The District argues that the Director's insistence upon 
compliance with PERIS's Rules with respect to the filing 
period is arbitrary and capricious. However, good and 
legitimate reasons exist for insistence upon compliance with 
the filing procedures. As we stated in City of Long Beach, 
1 PERB ir399.02, at 3119 (1968): 
The time limitations contained in the Rules 
create some degree of order and stability in 
the complex world of labor relations in 
public employment, and. thus, a failure to 
comply with them should not be easily 
condoned. 
This is particularly true in light of Rule 1f201.3(g), which 
provides: 
No petition may be filed for a unit which 
includes job titles that were within a unit 
for which, during the preceding twelve-month 
period, a petition was filed and processed to 
completion. 
It might well be argued that acceptance of a decertification 
petition out of time could delay or eliminate the window 
period which would otherwise exist. While periods of 
unchallenged representation status are required by the Act 
(§208.2), window periods, during which changes in the 
bargaining unit and representation status may occur, are 
similarly required. Agreement by the parties to alter or 
eliminate these window periods would be violative of the 
Act. The filing of an untimely decertification petition, 
even upon consent, which would or could produce the same 
result, would also be improper. 
^123 
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the decision of the Director 
be, and it hereby is, affirmed, and the 
petition is dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: August 18, 1987 
Albany, New York 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GENEVIEVE E. MAC LEAN, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-6930 
LOCAL 342. LONG ISLAND PUBLIC 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES. 
Respondent. 
GENEVIEVE E. MAC LEAN. p_rp_ se 
GOLDSTEIN & RUBINTON, P.C.. Attorneys for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Local 342. 
Long Island Public Service Employees (Local 342) from a 
decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) which found 
that Local 342 violated §209-a.2(a) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) by refusing to process Genevieve 
MacLean's (MacLean) grievance. In its exceptions. Local 342 
asserts, in essence, that the ALJ decision was not supported 
by a preponderance of the evidence; that the ALJ erred in 
determining the proper measure of damages; that the claim 
against it should have been dismissed upon the grounds of res 
judicata; that the ALJ improperly denied its motion for a new 
hearing due to an alleged conflict of interest of MacLean's 
counsel; and that the ALJ evidenced bias in the conduct of 
the hearing. 
JLJLJL^D 
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The charging party filed no cross exceptions to the ALJ 
decision. 
FACTS 
MacLean was appointed to a Deputy Village Clerk position 
with the Village of Valley Stream in 1979. In April 1980, 
she was appointed full-time Village Clerk. Thereafter, in 
the fall of 1980. her Village Clerk position was reduced to 
part-time and MacLean was appointed full-time to the position 
of Principal Clerk. None of these titles was in a bargaining 
unit. Effective May 19. 1983, MacLean's Principal Clerk 
position was reclassified to the title of Senior Clerk, a 
title within a bargaining unit represented by Local 342. 
) Several weeks later, on June 6, 1983. MacLean was terminated 
by the Village from her employment as a Senior Clerk, 
retaining, however, her part-time position as Village Clerk 
until that appointment expired in April 1984. 
Immediately after her termination from her Senior Clerk 
position, MacLean filed a grievance with Local 342 and the 
Village regarding her termination. On June 15, 1983, Murphy, 
Local 342's business agent, sent the following response to 
MacLean: 
We have received your grievance and after 
consultation with our union attorney, we have 
been advised that, although we normally do 
represent the title of Senior Clerk, due to 
the fact that you are still a Village Clerk 
and as such hold a confidential and exempt 
position, we are unable to represent you as a 
) member of the bargaining unit . . . . 
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The agency shop fee monies which had been withheld from 
MacLean's paycheck for two pay periods, during her tenure as 
a Senior Clerk, were simultaneously returned to her by Local 
342. 
In her charge. MacLean claimed, among other things,— 
that Local 342 denied her bargaining unit status and refused 
to process her grievance because she was politically 
unpopular. MacLean based her claim of improper motivation on 
a statement made at a meeting in March 1983 between herself, 
the Village attorney, and Galvin Murphy, Local 342 business 
agent, concerning another matter. At the meeting. MacLean 
informed Murphy that she had applied for membership in Local 
342. When asked why by Murphy, she responded that she was 
seeking protection. MacLean testified that Murphy responded 
that he "thought it was not a membership that the Union 
wanted to take because they might find themselves squeezed 
(sic) politically by my problems and I withdraw the 
application." 
Murphy testified that, prior to the meeting, he was not 
aware that MacLean held not only the Village Clerk title but 
held the title of Principal Clerk also. He testified that 
i/A charge filed by MacLean against the Village of 
Valley Stream arising out of the same events was dismissed 
by interim decision of the Director at 17 PERB ir4554 
(1984). Additionally, an allegation by MacLean that 
§209-a.2(b) of the Act had been violated was withdrawn 
prior to hearing. 
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MacLean sought to have the Principal Clerk title added to a 
Local 342 unit, and that MacLean and the Village Attorney, in 
his presence, discussed it and decided that at that time it 
would be difficult for Murphy to seek to add the title, since 
MacLean intended to retain her position as Village Clerk. 
Aside from the March statement of Murphy, MacLean 
presented no other affirmative evidence in support of her 
claim that the refusal to process her grievance filed 
approximately two months later was improperly motivated. 
However, the ALJ found that the reasons presented by Local 
342 were not credible and/or were inconsistent, and thus 
pretextual in nature, and that MacLean therefore met her 
burden of proving that the refusal to represent her was 
improperly motivated, in violation of Local 342's duty of 
fair representation under the Act. 
DISCUSSION 
Local 342 asserts that MacLean failed to meet her burden 
of proving that its refusal to represent her was improperly 
motivated and thus violative of the Act. However, the ALJ 
made certain credibility determinations in the course of the 
hearing, from which her conclusions were drawn. First, she 
found that Local 342 did not want her membership because it 
might be politically squeezed by her problems, a statement 
which the ALJ appropriately construed as establishing both 
knowledge of MacLean's political unpopularity, and that Local 
342 had a concern about the impact which her political 
Board - U-6930 -5 
unpopularity might have upon it if compelled to represent 
her. Second, the ALJ concluded that the various explanations 
offered by Local 342 for its rejection of MacLean's grievance 
and its removal of her from the bargaining unit were, for the 
reasons set forth in her decision, not credible. The ALJ 
accordingly found that the reasons for Local 342's conduct 
were pretextual, and that MacLean accordingly met her burden 
of proving that Local 342 acted upon improper motivation when 
it refused to represent her. It is our determination that 
the credibility findings made by the ALJ should not be 
disturbed, and that the record in this case fully supports 
the findings of fact made by the ALJ. Having affirmed the 
findings of fact, we also affirm the ALJ's conclusion that 
Local 342 violated §209-a.2(a) of the Act. A refusal to 
represent a bargaining unit member, which MacLean clearly 
was, because of that unit member's political unpopularity, 
constitutes an improper motive for the refusal to represent. 
Among its other exceptions. Local 342 asserts that, 
because no finding was made that the underlying grievance was 
meritorious, an essential element of proof in a duty of fair 
representation case was missing, and the finding should 
therefore be reversed. However, in the instant case, not 
only did Local 342 refuse to process MacLean's grievance but 
it also ejected her from the bargaining unit represented by 
Local 342, compelling her to retain an attorney and proceed 
11129 
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in court against the Village. According to the record 
evidence, the court proceeding reached a successful 
resolution from MacLean1s point of view, since she was 
reinstated to employment with the Village in 1985, in 
settlement of the litigation. Accordingly, we conclude that 
the removal of MacLean from the bargaining unit for improper 
reasons does not require a finding that her grievance was 
meritorious and. in any event, her claims against the 
Village, while not actually adjudicated to be meritorious, 
were clearly sufficient to achieve a settlement favorable to 
MacLean. 
Local 342 also asserts, in its exceptions, that this 
charge should have been dismissed upon the ground of res 
judicata, because a Federal District Court Judge, in a 
decision dated May 21, 1984. dismissed a claim made by 
MacLean against Local 342 alleging breach of the duty of fair 
representation. In that case, however. U.S. District Court 
Judge Frank X. Altimari found that although MacLean's 
complaint before him was couched in terms of 42 U.S.C. §1983, 
in fact, the claim alleged a breach of the duty of fair 
representation. Judge Altimari stated: "While the cause of 
action pled against the Union purports to be one for 
violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. §1983. it simply 
and singly alleges that the Union failed to fairly represent 
plaintiff. However, under the circumstances of this case, 
the Union had no such duty. See Wheeler v. Town of 
11130 
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Huntington, No. CV-83-2098(E.D.N.Y. March 30, 1984)." Judge 
Altimari accordingly dismissed MacLean's complaint against 
Local 342. 
From the language of the decision itself, it might well 
be argued that the District Court's dismissal of the 
complaint was on its merits, giving rise to an appropriate 
claim that the doctrine of res judicata applies. However. 
the Wheeler case, cited by the District Court, sheds further 
light on the basis upon which Judge Altimari dismissed 
MacLean's complaint. The Wheeler case, which also alleged a 
claim of violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983. was brought by other 
plaintiffs, but against Local 342. In that case. U.S. 
District Court Judge Jacob Mishler dismissed the plaintiffs' 
§1983 claims upon the ground that they in fact set forth a 
duty of fair representation claim only. Judge Mishler's 
ground for dismissing the complaint was not that no breach of 
the duty of fair representation had been alleged, but that 
because political subdivisions are not subject to the 
National Labor Relations Act, from whence the Federal duty of 
fair representation derives, no Federal cause of action for 
the breach of duty of fair representation exists for 
political subdivision employees. Judge Mishler stated the 
following: 
Local 342 represented plaintiffs during their 
dispute with the Town of Huntington, a 
political subdivision of the State of New 
York. Consequently. Local 342 had no implied 
Federal duty of fair representation. See 
11131 
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Nelson v. Southeastern Pa. Trans. Auth.. 420 
F.Supp. 1374. 1384 (e.d. Pa. 1976). Any such 
duty must be based on state law. Id. 
Judge Mishler accordingly found, in Wheeler, that plaintiffs' 
claim must be based on State law rather than on Federal law, 
and that the Federal Court was accordingly without 
jurisdiction of the claim. 
The reliance of Judge Altimari on the Wheeler decision 
indicates quite clearly that his dismissal of MacLean's 
complaint against Local 342 was based upon the same 
conclusion, that is, that the plaintiff had failed to set 
forth a Federal claim for relief. We accordingly find that 
the Federal Court claim was not dismissed upon its merits, 
but rather upon jurisdictional grounds, and that the doctrine 
of res judicata therefore has no applicability to the case 
before us. Local 342's exception in this regard is dismissed. 
In others of its exceptions. Local 342 alleges that 
because of an alleged conflict of interest of MacLean's 
2/ 
counsel.— its motion for a new hearing should have been 
granted, and the awarding of legal fees as a remedy is 
inappropriate. As stated by the ALJ at the time Local 342's 
motion for a new hearing was made, this agency is not the 
.^/MacLean was represented by counsel during the first 
four days of hearing in this matter, but appeared pro se on 
the final day of hearing and on this appeal. 
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appropriate forum for determining whether a breach of the 
Code of Professional Responsibility has occurred. In any 
event, no evidence of misconduct was offered by Local 342 in 
support of its opinion that the Code had been violated. 
Furthermore, with respect to the remedy ordered by the ALJ of 
compensation to MacLean in the form of reasonable attorney's 
fees, the remedy applies to MacLean's legal expenses incurred 
in connection with pursuing her claims against the Village, 
and not the legal expenses incurred in processing the instant 
charge. Since the attorneys representing MacLean in her 
action against the Village are not the same attorneys as 
referenced in Local 342's exception, its argument concerning 
the award of attorney's fees is inapposite. 
We have reviewed the remaining exceptions presented by 
Local 342. They are unsupported by any references to the 
record and we find no basis for them in the record or Local 
342's brief. They are therefore dismissed as being without 
merit. 
Based upon the foregoing, the decision of the 
Administrative Law Judge is hereby affirmed and it is 
ORDERED THAT Local 342, Long Island Public Service 
Employees reimburse Genevieve MacLean for any reasonable and 
previously unreimbursed legal fees and related expenses which 
she has actually incurred in connection with her processing 
of her claim against the Incorporated Village of Valley 
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Stream for unlawful discharge without Local 342's 
representation.— 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Local 342. Long Island Public 
Service Employees cease and desist from refusing to represent 
employees consistent with its duty of fair representation 
under the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act. and that it 
sign and post notice in the form attached at all locations 
ordinarily used to post written communications to unit 
employees. 
DATED: August 18. 1987 
Albany. New York 
' j Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
Walter L. Eisenberg. Member 
•^The award of attorney's fees is an appropriate 
remedy here. See Local 418.CSEA (Diaz). 18 PERB ir3047 
(1985). Because the record is silent concerning whether, 
and to what extent, attorney's fees have been previously 
reimbursed, the recommended order of the Administrative Law 
Judge is hereby modified to limit the award of the 
attorney's fees to those which have not previously been 
reimbursed. 
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APPENDIX 
OTICE10 ILL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees within the units represented by Local 342, Long 
Island Public Service Employees that Local 342, Long Island Public Service 
Employees: 
1. Will reimburse Genevieve MacLean for any reasonable and 
previously unreimbursed legal fees and related expenses 
which she has actually incurred in connection with her 
processing of her claim against the Incorporated Village 
of Valley Stream for unlawful discharge without Local 342's 
representation. 
2. Will not refuse to represent employees consistent with its 
duty of fair representation under the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act. 
. .Local. .3.4.2, .Long. Island .Bublic. Service- -Employees • 
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 11135 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ONEIDA COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION. 
Petitioner. 
-and- CASE NOT M86-542 
COUNTY OF ONEIDA and ONEIDA COUNTY 
SHERIFF. 
Joint Employer. 
JAMES M. KERNAN. ESQw. for Petitioner 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the Oneida 
County Deputy Sheriff's Benevolent Association (Association) 
to a decision of the Director of Conciliation (Director) 
dated May 27. 1987. In that decision, the Director rejected 
a demand for the assignment of an arbitrator for the purpose 
of conducting compulsory interest arbitration between the 
Association and the County of Oneida and Oneida County 
Sheriff, upon the ground that "Deputy Sheriffs are not 
eligible for compulsory interest arbitration under the 
1/ 
statute".— 
^/section 209.4 of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act). 
11136 
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The Association argues that deputy sheriffs are police 
officers pursuant to the provisions of §1.20 of the Criminal 
Procedure Law of the State of New York. In support of its 
contention that deputy sheriffs are police officers, the 
Association provides, together with its exceptions, a 
decision issued by the Honorable Norman E. Joslin. Justice of 
the Supreme Court, Erie County, which held that deputy 
sheriffs are in fact police officers. Arguing, as it does, 
that deputy sheriffs represented by it in Oneida County are 
police officers, the Association contends that §209.4 of the 
Act entitles them to the procedures of compulsory interest 
arbitration. 
Section 209.4 applies to "officers or members of any 
organized fire department, police force or police department 
of any county, city, except the city of New York, town, 
village or fire or police district . . . ." 
The argument that because deputy sheriffs are police 
officers, they are entitled to coverage under §209.4 of the 
Act is not new. The issue was first addressed in 1974, in 
Erie County Sheriff and Erie County, 7 PERB 1f3057, by this 
Board. In that case, it was acknowledged that deputy 
sheriffs are police officers, but the Board nevertheless held 
that a sheriff's department is not a police force or police 
department within the meaning of §209.4 of the Act. In so 
doing, the Board cited various provisions of State law and 
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the New York State Constitution as bases for determining that 
a distinction exists in law between a sheriff's department 
and a police force or police department. 
Since the Erie case, the issue of entitlement of deputy 
sheriffs to compulsory interest arbitration has been reargued 
on numerous occasions. In County of Rockland. 11 PERB ir3050 
(1978), the Board again considered the question, and for the 
reasons set forth in Erie, supra, held, at 3078, that "deputy 
sheriffs in the Patrol Division are not covered by the 
interest arbitration provision [of the Act] . . . ." This 
decision was confirmed, without opinion, by the Appellate 
Division, Second Department, 67 A.D.2d 1109. 12 PERB ir7004 
(1979). 
Thereafter, a demand for interest arbitration was made 
on behalf of deputy sheriffs in Yates County. In Yates 
County. 16 PERB ir8001. at 8001 (1982). the argument was again 
rejected, upon the ground that a "sheriff's department is not 
an 'organized police force or police department1 within the 
meaning of Civil Service Law §209.4 as amended by Chapter 725 
of the Laws of 1974." Again, the Board's decision in that 
matter was affirmed by the New York State Supreme Court, 
Ontario County, in a February 25, 1983 decision (16 PERB 
ir7006). The Court there found, at 7007, "that respondent 
[PERB] has a rational basis for its determination and that 
its interpretation of the statute in question is entitled to 
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great weight. The court may not substitute its judgment for 
the judgment of respondent where that judgment is neither 
arbitrary nor capricious." The petition to annul PERB's 
determination was accordingly dismissed. 
This long-standing and oft-challenged interpretation of 
§209.4 of the Act will not be disturbed. The status of 
deputy sheriffs as police officers has not in the past, and 
is not now, dispositive. What is dispositive is that 
sheriffs' departments are not police departments within the 
meaning of the Act. As we stated in Erie County, supra, at 
3093: "This conclusion is based upon our reading of the 
language of the statute and our understanding of the 
legislative intent; it does not involve any judgment as to 
whether or not arbitration should be mandated to resolve 
negotiations disputes involving sheriffs' departments." 
Based upon the foregoing, the decision of the Director 
is affirmed, and the petition is dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: August 18. 19 87 
Albany. New York 
<Zl*%-4£-t^ 
farold R. Newman, Chairman 
!W9 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
LOCAL 445. INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3228 
COUNTY OF SULLIVAN. 
Employer. 
-and-
LOCAL 750. COUNCIL 66. AFSCME. 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 445. International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters has been designated and selected by a 
majority of the employees of the above-named public employer, in 
the unit agreed upon by the parties and described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
11140 
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negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: All probationary, provisional and 
permanent employees in the Department 
of Public Works. 
Excluded: Appointed Officials. Commissioner, 
--^ lx.e-C-t.ox_-oi-_0_p_exa_ti.ojiS-»_Ro.ad_Ma±nt.eiia.n.c.e 
Superintendent. Secretary to 
Commissioner of Public Works (Sr. 
Stenographer). Office Manager. Garage 
Superintendent. Senior Civil Engineer, 
temporary, part-time, and seasonal 
employees. Supervisory Unit employees, 
and all other employees. 
FURTHER. IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local 445. International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters. The duty to negotiate collectively 
includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable times and 
confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an 
agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the execution 
of a written agreement incorporating any agreement reached if 
requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a 
concession. 
DATED: August 18. 1987 
Albany, New York 
11 MI 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
ti<tec~ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Membe 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. 
INC.. AFSCME. LOCAL #1000. AFL-CIO. 
Petitioner. 
-and- CASE NO. C^3246 
TOWN OF ORCHARD PARK. 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected. 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act. 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Civil Service Employees 
Association. Inc.. AFSCME. Local #1000. AFL-CIO has been 
designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named employer, in the unit described below, as their 
exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
11142 
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Unit: Included: All regular full-time mechanics, 
heavy equipment operators, light 
equipment operators, truck drivers 
and laborers employed in the 
Employer's Highway and Water & 
Sewer Departments. 
Excluded: Foremen, deputy highway superin-
tendent-, -highwa-y—super_intend£nt-, ._ 
all other employees, guards, 
management officials and super-
visors . 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Civil Service Employees 
Association, Inc., AFSCME, Local #1000, AFL-CIO. The duty to 
negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, 
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, 
and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation 
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require 
the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 18, 1987 
Albany, New York 
Harold R. Newman, Chairman 
z 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Me 
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